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Abstract
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
remains understudied, despite its dramatic growth in recent 
decades, particularly in the humanitarian sphere. In this 
article I examine key factors driving IOM’s expansion, and 
implications for the forced migration regime. Despite lack-
ing a formal protection mandate, IOM has thrived by act-
ing as an entrepreneur, capitalizing on its malleability and 
reputation for efficiency, and carving out distinctive roles in 
activities including post-disaster camp management, data 
collection, and assistance for migrant workers in crises. I 
reflect on IOM’s efforts to accrue increased authority and 
power, and suggest that understanding IOM’s humanitarian 
engagements is now essential to understanding the organi-
zation itself and, increasingly, the forced migration regime.
Résumé
En dépit de sa croissance spectaculaire ces dernières décen-
nies, particulièrement dans le domaine humanitaire, l’Or-
ganisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) reste 
peu étudiée. J’envisage dans cet article les facteurs clés qui 
ont conduit à l’expansion de l’OIM et leurs conséquences sur 
le régime de la migration forcée. Bien que n’ayant pas de 
mandat officiel de protection, l’OIM s’est en effet développée 
comme un entrepreneur, en exploitant sa malléabilité et 
sa réputation d’efficience et en se taillant des activités dis-
tinctes parmi lesquelles la gestion des camps faisant suite 
à des catastrophes, la collecte de données, et l’assistance 
apportée aux travailleurs migrants dans les contextes de 
crise. Je révèle les efforts de l’OIM pour accroître son autorité 
et son pouvoir, et suggère que comprendre les engagements 
humanitaires de cette organisation est aujourd’hui essentiel 
pour comprendre l’organisation elle-même et, progressive-
ment, le régime de la migration forcée. 
Introduction1
The work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in responding to forced migration has been extensively analyzed,2 yet 
the role of another major intergovernmental organization, 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), remains 
understudied. Established in 1951 as the Provisional Intergov-
ernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from 
Europe (PICMME), IOM is not a UN agency, but became “part 
of the UN family” in September 2016 as a “related organiza-
tion” of the UN.3 The lack of in-depth analysis of IOM is strik-
ing, given the agency’s dramatic expansion since the 1990s: 
its pool of member states has grown from 67 in 1998 to 165 in 
2015, while its budget increased five-fold from $242.2 million 
in 1998 to $1.4 billion in 2014.4 With some 10,000 staff in 
500 offices and duty stations, IOM is now by some measures 
as large as UNHCR, with its approximately 10,100 staff in 471 
locations.5
This article examines key factors explaining IOM’s dra-
matic growth over the past twenty years, and the implications 
for the forced migration regime. Recognizing that the vast 
majority of IOM’s expansion is attributable to its increased 
involvement in humanitarian contexts, I suggest that despite 
its lack of a formal humanitarian protection mandate, IOM 
has thrived by acting as an entrepreneur, capitalizing on its 
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malleability and reputation for efficiency. In particular, it 
has carved out distinctive roles for itself in activities includ-
ing post-disaster camp management, data collection, and 
assistance for migrant workers in crises, while it continues 
to navigate controversies linked to some of its “migration 
management” work. Drawing on Barnett, Finnemore, and 
Duvall’s influential scholarship on power, authority, and 
international organizations, I reflect on the extent to which 
IOM is accruing increased power and influence in the forced 
migration regime, and suggest that understanding IOM’s 
humanitarian engagements is now essential to understand-
ing the organization and, increasingly, the regime itself. I 
begin by briefly summarizing IOM’s organizational develop-
ment, and its increased humanitarian involvement. I then 
explore key factors underpinning IOM’s growth, before dis-
cussing IOM’s evolving power and influence, and its potential 
implications.
This article is a preliminary reflection that is part of a 
broader project on the evolution of IOM in the humanitarian 
sphere. My aim in this exploratory piece is largely to raise 
questions about the shifting roles and power of IOM, rather 
than to offer definitive answers to them. While the present 
article does not aspire to offer policy prescriptions, my hope 
is that ultimately this work helps to advance the conversa-
tion amongst scholars, policymakers, and practitioners on 
IOM’s current and potential future roles, and the ways in 
which more systematic, protection-oriented responses may 
be ensured for displaced persons who fall outside UNHCR’s 
traditional mandate.
While focusing on IOM’s work with displaced popula-
tions, I recognize the impossibility of drawing a bright line 
between voluntary and forced migration, and the need to 
maintain careful awareness of the tensions between humani-
tarian and human rights principles, and programs in areas 
such as “assisted voluntary returns.”6 I also recognize that 
there is some debate over whether IOM can rightfully be 
considered a humanitarian agency. Although IOM charac-
terizes itself as a humanitarian organization,7 some counter 
that “this language effaces the coercive practices inherent” 
in IOM’s involvement in the “ordering of movement” and 
activities such as detention.8 In considering IOM’s evolution 
as a humanitarian actor, my intention is not to minimize 
such ethical concerns, but to accurately position it amongst 
the growing ranks of institutions (including corporations) 
with multiple “hats,” mandates, and interests that engage in 
humanitarian work, generating new possibilities, tensions, 
and challenges for the forced migration regime. 
To this end, I use the term humanitarian engagement to 
refer broadly to efforts to respond to emergencies and their 
aftermath; normatively, these efforts are to focus on saving 
lives, reducing suffering, and protecting rights. I use the 
term forced migration regime to refer to the interconnected 
norms and institutions that inform and facilitate coopera-
tion in response to displacement across borders as well as 
internally. Scholarly attention has typically focused on the 
more discrete refugee regime, in which the 1951 Refugee 
Convention encapsulates the cardinal norms, and UNHCR is 
the primary institution. Analyzing the broader global forced 
migration regime has the advantage of underscoring the 
links between different “categories” of displaced persons, and 
the ways in which the norms and institutions developed to 
respond to refugees have, since the early 1990s, been recon-
sidered, adapted, and assigned to advance more coordinated 
responses to refugee-related populations such as internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and labour migrants uprooted in 
conflict situations. 
IOM’s Expanding Humanitarian Engagement: 
Background
PICMME was established in 1951, transformed in 1952 into the 
International Committee for European Migration (ICEM), 
rebranded in 1980 as the Intergovernmental Committee for 
Migration, and finally emerged in 1989 as the International 
Organization for Migration.9 Over this period, the body 
evolved from a regionally focused logistics agency to a global 
organization working in a wide range of voluntary and 
forced migration scenarios and dedicated—in theory, if not 
always in practice—to managed migration “for the benefit 
of all.” Migration management serves as a loose “umbrella” 
concept under which diverse activities are clustered, from 
refugee resettlement, evacuations, camp management, 
policy development, and counter-trafficking training to the 
implementation of detention programs and “assisted vol-
untary return” schemes for unsuccessful asylum seekers.10 
(Importantly, IOM uses the term migration to include both 
cross-border and internal movements.) The agency divides 
its work into four general areas: (1) migration and develop-
ment; (2) facilitating migration; (3) regulating migration; 
and (4) addressing forced migration.11 To a certain extent the 
IOM’s work with forced migrants crosscuts these four areas, 
but has come to occupy the lion’s share of IOM’s operational 
budget and staff resources.
IOM and its precursors were mandated to facilitate orderly 
migration flows generally, including the “migration of refu-
gees” (ICEM Constitution, Article 1.3). Notably, IOM does not 
have an explicit mandate to protect the rights of migrants, 
including refugees and IDPs. Many of IOM’s member states 
see the agency’s lack of a formal protection mandate as a key 
strength; for its part, “IOM has come to see protection falling 
within its mandate, although others might contest the extent 
of the agency’s commitment to protection principles.”12 The 
agency’s constitution indicates that member states must have 
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a “demonstrated interest in the principle of free movement 
of persons.”13 While minimalistic, for decades this expres-
sion of normative commitment served the important politi-
cal function of precluding the membership of Communist 
states that prevented citizens from leaving their territories. 
Like UNHCR, the organization’s work was initially limited to 
Europe, but this restriction was eventually lifted in light of 
the need for coordinated international responses to forced 
migration further afield. As Elie points out, both UNHCR and 
PICMME were “offsprings of the IRO [International Refugee 
Organization], but neither were its true successor.”14 UNHCR 
was delegated to take on IRO’s legal protection work, but 
the United States, which dominated negotiations over the 
establishment of both UNHCR and PICMME, opposed the 
creation of an operational UN agency with responsibility for 
(forced) migrants. Indeed, the US Congress decreed in 1951 
that no American funding for responding to displacement 
and population challenges in Europe could be “allocated to 
any international organization which has in its member-
ship any Communist-dominated or Communist-controlled 
country.”15 This initially precluded a strong operational role 
for UNHCR.
Although IOM (and its precursors) has long represented 
itself as a migration agency with a broad interest in the move-
ment of people, in the contemporary context and at various 
points in its history, the organization has in fact worked pre-
dominantly with displaced persons, whether refugees or IDPs. 
For instance, by 1974 some 90 per cent of those supported 
by ICEM were refugees.16 Despite the agency’s long history of 
engagement with displaced populations, it has often “been 
dismissed by scholars as a significant international actor in 
its own right. Throughout its existence, in fact, it frequently 
has been derided as a ‘travel agency,’ booking passages for 
all kinds of migrants.”17 When the IOM Constitution was 
adopted in 1989, several of its objectives pertained directly 
to the organization’s work with forced migrants, and in the 
humanitarian sector generally, providing a foundation for 
more recent expanded humanitarian engagement. Accord-
ing to Perruchoud, the objectives guiding the development 
of the IOM Constitution included fortifying the organiza-
tion’s “basic humanitarian character and orientation,” and 
underscoring the importance of cooperation among states 
and international agencies on refugee issues, and migration 
more broadly.18
IOM’s sometimes contradictory and controversial activi-
ties reflect not only its lack of an explicit legal protection 
mandate, but also its governance structure, and its status as 
an intergovernmental organization outside—but now closely 
related to—the UN. IOM has adopted human rights discourse, 
but views on its roles and responsibilities vary significantly 
between its two main operational divisions, the Department 
of Migration Management and the larger Department of 
Operations and Emergencies. The latter is responsible for 
IOM’s field engagement in humanitarian contexts, although 
the work of both departments affects forced migrants in a 
range of situations, as detailed in a key document for the 
organization, the 2012 “Migration Crisis Operational Frame-
work.”19 IOM’s member states, which govern the organization 
through the IOM Council, value and often capitalize on IOM’s 
ability to work “on the edges” of the UN system, where it can 
execute programs that states wish to see implemented, unen-
cumbered by rigorous formal protection mandates. As it is 
almost entirely dependent on project-based funding, IOM has 
often agreed to implement initiatives that arguably constrain 
rather than advance the rights and well-being of migrants, 
fostering the perception that IOM is simply a servant of its 
state masters.20 At the same time, key member states and 
leaders within IOM itself have advocated a closer relation-
ship with the UN and more explicit protection commitments, 
culminating in the 2016 Agreement between the United 
Nations and the International Organization for Migration, 
under which IOM became a related organization in the UN 
system, unanimously acknowledged by member states as an 
“essential contributor in the field of human mobility, [includ-
ing] in the protection of migrants.”21
IOM’s dramatically expanded involvement in forced migra-
tion crises has unfolded against the backdrop of the recent 
growth in humanitarian emergencies worldwide, and the 
expanded scope and functioning of the forced migration 
regime, with the emergence of IDPs and migrants in crises as 
key categories of concern alongside refugees. However, these 
factors alone cannot explain IOM’s expansion. Rather, as dis-
cussed in the following section, IOM’s growth is also attrib-
utable to its efforts to strategically position itself, leveraging 
its malleability and its reputation for logistical efficacy and 
efficiency to entrepreneurially expand into new areas of work.
Explaining IOM’s Increased Engagement in the 
Forced Migration Regime
In 2007, IOM member states adopted a new vision for the 
organization that identified twelve strategic priorities, many 
of which relate to an increased role for the agency vis-à-vis 
forced migration. These include: enhancing “the humane 
and orderly management of migration and the effective 
respect for the human rights of migrants in accordance with 
international law;” increasing efforts to tackle human smug-
gling, trafficking, and other forms of “irregular migration”; 
participating in coordinated inter-agency humanitarian 
operations by providing migration services and other sup-
port in emergency and post-crisis contexts; and facilitating 
the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees, IDPs, and 
other migrants.22
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By 2011, projects undertaken in emergency and post-
conflict contexts already represented the majority of IOM’s 
$1.27 billion budget.23 IOM participates actively in the Inter-
Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the main mechanism 
for coordinating international agencies’ humanitarian action, 
operates in the field as part of the UN country team, and often 
participates in UN humanitarian country team planning, 
while also working to develop its involvement in longer-
term developmental responses related to forced migration, 
such as disaster risk reduction.24 An influential 2008 Sida 
evaluation of IOM’s humanitarian assistance efforts catalyzed 
a detailed humanitarian policy development process that 
resulted in the release in 2015 of a new policy entitled “IOM’s 
Humanitarian Policy: Principles for Humanitarian Action,” 
which is presently being implemented, alongside more regu-
lar IOM–humanitarian NGO consultations.25 These initiatives 
merit ongoing study, as they may further systematize IOM’s 
engagement in the forced migration regime and respond to 
the need to more clearly articulate and institutionalize the 
agency’s relationship to core human rights and humanitar-
ian principles related to the protection of forced migrants.
Given these developments, current explanations for why 
states turn to IOM to undertake work in the humanitarian 
sector and in the context of the forced migration regime 
increasingly appear underdeveloped. For example, some 
suggest that states call on IOM principally “because it is out-
side of the UN frameworks and therefore unencumbered by 
the human rights obligations and state scrutiny the UNHCR 
faces.”26 While these factors have certainly influenced state 
decision-making, such explanations sit in tension with 
how powerful member states such as the United States and 
Sweden have pushed IOM to join the UN system as a related 
organization, and develop its new humanitarian policy, 
which expressly ties the agency to core human rights and 
humanitarian principles. Further, this explanation over-
looks the significance of IOM’s own concerted efforts to capi-
talize on its reputation for efficiency and nimbly position 
itself to respond to emerging challenges (a strategy driven 
in part by IOM’s constant need to raise money through 
projects, given its lack of core funding). This approach also 
discounts the significant interaction effects between UNHCR 
and IOM in the context of the evolving forced migration 
regime, in which member states have restricted UNHCR’s 
engagement with “newer” forms of displacement (such as 
forced migration linked to the effects of climate change) in 
light of concerns regarding its capacity to successfully exe-
cute its core legal mandate, and have turned to IOM to help 
paper over persistent gaps in responses to different forms of 
displacement. 
An Organizational Entrepreneur
Statist examinations of international organizations typically 
consider them simply as servants of states, rather than as 
potentially autonomous and even powerful actors.27 This 
assumption of unmitigated state control is particularly 
strong vis-à-vis IOM, given its lack of a formal protection 
mandate and pronounced reliance on project-based financ-
ing. However, analyzing IOM’s striking entrepreneurialism 
brings into focus how the agency seeks, even if in modest 
ways, to expand its influence and autonomy.
Like many international organizations, IOM has a long his-
tory of entrepreneurial behaviour. For example, as demand 
declined in the early years of the agency’s existence for the 
migration of Europe’s so-called “surplus population,” ICEM 
endeavoured to identify alternative activities that it could 
undertake, such as supporting the movement of refugees as 
labourers.28 Today, IOM “picks up the slack” on a remarkably 
wide range of issues in emergency and post-crisis contexts 
(some only tangentially related to migration), filling gaps 
on issues including disarmament, demobilization, and rein-
tegration of former combatants; disaster risk reduction and 
mitigation; and the management of reparations programs 
and initiatives relating to housing, land, and property.
As an organizational entrepreneur in the humanitarian 
sector, IOM capitalizes on its reputation for being able to 
execute complex logistical projects in challenging circum-
stances, and more generally as an efficient, nimble body that 
can mobilize rapidly to respond to requests for assistance. 
In identifying new areas for expansion, IOM also leverages 
its ability to be flexible, given its very broad mandate and 
the fact that the IOM Constitution (unlike, for example, the 
UNHCR Statute) does not specifically define the populations 
that are to be the focus of the agency’s work. From the outset, 
the “mandate of ICEM was not limited to refugees in the strict 
sense, but extended to other persons in refugee-like situa-
tions”;29 foreshadowing the increased role the agency would 
come to play in relation to IDPs, a document brought before 
the ICEM Council in 1979 noted that the “organization has 
also been called upon to assist a growing number of so called 
‘potential refugees,’ i.e. persons who find themselves in the 
condition of refugees in their own country.”30 IOM’s ability 
to flexibly respond to different groups has been beneficial 
for IOM itself, but arguably also for displaced populations in 
need of assistance, and UNHCR, which in some instances has 
had limited capacity, as the result of its status as a UN agency, 
to work in particular countries.31 
At the same time as IOM has operated as a jack of all trades, 
a core element of its entrepreneurial strategy has also been to 
carve out distinctive niches that can be parlayed into more 
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structural responsibility and influence. For example, IOM 
has assumed increasing levels of responsibility for conduct-
ing emergency evacuations; collecting data on displaced 
populations; and assisting migrant workers displaced in 
emergencies, such as in Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion and 
Gulf War, and in Libya during and after the 2011 revolution. 
Perhaps most significantly, IOM has become a major player 
in disaster-induced displacement. It has conducted extensive 
research and facilitated discussions on displacement associ-
ated with the effects of climate change, and has taken on 
major operational roles in post-disaster displacement crises. 
By 2010, IOM had conducted over 500 projects in this field, 
spanning emergency response as well as recovery, mitigation 
work, and preparedness efforts.32 Since 2010, IOM’s involve-
ment in this area has increased dramatically, with massive 
disaster response efforts in Pakistan, the Philippines, and 
post-earthquake Haiti, the largest operation in IOM’s his-
tory. By assuming responsibility for IDP camp coordination 
and management after natural disasters in the context of the 
IASC’s cluster system for humanitarian response, IOM solidi-
fied a major new role, upon which it may cultivate increased 
power and influence in the forced migration regime.
Increased Power and Influence? IOM’s Growing 
Role in the Forced Migration Regime
IOM’s expanded humanitarian engagement has helped to 
paper over gaps in the forced migration regime, particularly 
relating to displaced people who do not qualify for refugee 
status. Yet if the regime is to maintain its commitment to 
key human rights and humanitarian principles, a clear need 
remains to more systematically integrate protection consid-
erations into IOM’s work, and to resolve dissonances associ-
ated with its continued involvement in controversial activi-
ties such as “assisted voluntary returns.” (As Koch points 
out, UNHCR and IOM often collaborate closely on assisted 
voluntary returns, although IOM attracts the lion’s share of 
criticism.33) Achieving increased coherence in the agency’s 
work, and in turn greater power and influence in the forced 
migration regime, is limited by competition between IOM’s 
operational departments, and competing pressures from dif-
ferent branches of IOM’s member states, who may encourage 
the development of IOM as a principled humanitarian actor 
at the same time as they continue to press it to undertake 
work that fits uneasily with humanitarian and human rights 
standards.
To be sure, the view on IOM’s power and influence in the 
forced migration regime looks very different in Geneva and 
in the field. In Geneva, IOM maintains a relatively small, 
understaffed headquarters, meaning that it has only lim-
ited presence in inter-agency meetings where humanitar-
ian actors set agendas and jockey for influence. In contrast, 
particularly after major disasters, IOM rapidly ramps up its 
field presence to become one of the largest operational agen-
cies, exercising power and influence in diverse ways, from 
coordination and resource distribution to agenda-setting 
and lobbying. 
In this section, I use Barnett and Finnemore’s work on 
the authority of international organizations, and Barnett and 
Duvall’s typology of power in global governance, to bring 
into focus some of the primary ways in which IOM exerts 
different forms of power.34 Barnett and Duvall discuss four 
forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and 
productive. However, in their application of this typology to 
liberal international organizations, Barnett and Finnemore 
focus on compulsory, institutional, and productive power. I 
follow Barnett and Finnemore in restricting my discussion to 
these three forms, which are most relevant to understanding 
IOM’s evolving roles. I also consider, albeit to a lesser extent, 
the ways in which IOM is subject to these varying forms of 
power. In undertaking this analysis, I understand IOM to be 
situated—like most major intergovernmental organizations 
involved in humanitarian response—at the “intersection of 
the nation-state, international human rights regimes, and 
neo-liberal governance.”35 That is, IOM’s work is shaped in 
varying degrees by human rights principles, state interests, 
and the drive to outsource—whether to NGOs, intergovern-
mental organizations, or private actors—goods and services 
that have in some contexts been provided by states, includ-
ing protection, emergency assistance, and reconstruction 
support. While IOM is often treated in the literature (to the 
extent it is considered at all) as an institutional outlier, this 
analysis suggests that in many ways IOM has much in com-
mon with other international organizations struggling to 
develop and exert power and influence in a contested field. 
This analysis also underscores the point that IOM’s accrual 
and exercise of authority and power is not a linear process: 
its behaviour on some fronts detracts from its authority and 
consequently its power as an emerging humanitarian actor, 
while at the same time, through other activities, it strength-
ens its position and contributions to the field.
International organizations’ exercise of power is, as Bar-
nett and Finnemore argue, intimately tied to their capacity as 
bureaucracies to establish and exert authority.36 Understood 
as an actor’s ability “to deploy discursive and institutional 
resources in order to get other actors to defer judgement to 
them,” authority may be delegated, or it may be grounded in 
moral claims or expertise.37 While some protection protago-
nists within IOM are eager for the organization to establish 
greater authority through more systematic promotion of 
and adherence to human rights and humanitarian principles, 
their agenda puts them in competition with other interests 
within the agency, as garnering and preserving authority 
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in the humanitarian sector may constrain some of its other 
migration management activities.
Delegated, Moral, and Expert Authority
In a basic sense, international organizations’ authority is 
always rooted in the fact of state delegation.38 However, 
authority, and by extension varying degrees of autonomy, 
may also be founded on an organization’s moral claims and/
or expertise. At the institutional level, without a robust man-
date, IOM enjoys very little systematically delegated authority. 
It is not, however, atypical in this respect: “Mandates to inter-
national organizations are often vague or broad, or contain 
conflicting directives … Consequently, mandates need to be 
interpreted and, even with oversight, the agenda, interests, 
experience, values, and expertise of IO staff heavily colour 
any organization’s response to delegated tasks. Thus, inter-
national organizations must be autonomous actors in some 
ways simply to fulfill their delegated tasks,” perhaps all the 
more so if these tasks are nebulous, as in the case of IOM.39 
IOM does not enjoy clear, delegated authority over a par-
ticular issue or population, as with UNHCR and refugee pro-
tection,40 and is particularly full-throated in its rhetorical 
commitment to serving the will of its member states when 
they delegate IOM to execute particular tasks. However, in 
this respect IOM differs from other IOs in degree, but not 
in kind. As Barnett and Finnemore emphasize, delegation 
may enable international agencies to act with a degree of 
independence, but this is contingent on appearing to loyally 
adhere to their mandates and member states’ directives.41
International organizations are often established to 
advance shared values, which underpin their attempts to 
act authoritatively. In the case of organizations working in 
the forced migration regime, they claim authority on the 
basis of their efforts to promote the rights and well-being 
of those pushed from their homes.42 Given its lack of a for-
mal protection mandate and the critiques that IOM sustains 
for the negative human rights implications of some of its 
work, the agency appears on some levels ill-positioned to 
claim authority on moral grounds. Yet, when it was created 
,the organization was undergirded (however loosely) by a 
moral commitment to facilitate free movement, in contrast 
to Communist governments’ common practice of restrict-
ing their citizens’ departures. Since the end of the Cold War, 
IOM’s core message has been that migration can work “for 
the benefit of all”—a message that openly appeals to states’ 
self-interest, but arguably as a strategic way of advancing 
free movement as a moral good. 
Beyond “straightforward mandated moral authority … 
international organizations often traffic in another kind of 
moral appeal. IOs of all kinds often emphasize their neutral-
ity, impartiality, and objectivity in ways that make essentially 
moral claims against particularistic self-serving states.”43 
IOM is comparatively reticent when it comes to engaging in 
this kind of appeal, perhaps because it tries to simultane-
ously play multiple games that sometimes militate against 
each other. That is, it strives to increase its moral authority 
as a humanitarian actor, but also to cultivate its perceived 
comparative advantage in catering to states’ desires. Many 
within IOM are aware that it cannot continue to expand 
in the (growing, lucrative) humanitarian sphere—a field 
heavily conditioned by normative principles—without 
more purposefully augmenting its moral authority.44 The 
humanitarian policy process instigated by the 2008 Sida 
review is in part a response to this concern and could poten-
tially translate into significantly increased moral authority. 
As this process unfolds, IOM has meanwhile increased its 
deployment of protection officers in post-disaster contexts, 
stressed its practical efforts to advance migrants’ rights, and 
emphasized the “de facto protection” provided through its 
activities.45
While IOM has weak claims to delegated and moral 
authority in comparison to an agency such as UNHCR, it has 
made considerable progress in cultivating expert authority. 
States are driven to establish specialized bureaucracies in 
part by the desire to delegate tasks to perceived experts.46 
Developed on the basis of its involvement in displacement 
situations in Uganda (1972–4), Bangladesh (1973), Chile 
(from 1973), Cyprus (1974), and Vietnam (1975), IOM’s repu-
tation for logistical competency, particularly in humanitar-
ian transportation, translates into a considerable source of 
expert authority for the agency.47 Linked to its reputation 
for the cost-effective execution of complex technical opera-
tions, IOM uses corporate rhetoric that on a certain levels sits 
in tension with the traditional modus operandi, principles, 
and values of the humanitarian sector, and may from some 
perspectives undercut its authority. Yet the humanitar-
ian world is also an industry increasingly characterized by 
business-oriented approaches (and the direct involvement 
of for-profit corporations), in which IOM’s reputation for 
efficiency and strong logistics positions it to thrive. IOM has 
further burnished its expert authority through increased 
investment in research, and through spearheading standard-
setting processes on migrant workers in countries grappling 
with crises.48
Overall, the power of international organizations, as 
bureaucracies, rests in their capacity to represent themselves 
as legitimate authorities that are not overtly exercising power 
but neutrally assisting others.49 Depending on the sources 
of their authority, international organizations, including IOM, 
will exercise power in particular ways and to varying degrees, 
whether through direct or indirect regulation, or by helping 
to “constitute the world that needs to be regulated.”50
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Compulsory Power: Directly Shaping Behaviour
Typically associated with physical or economic power, com-
pulsory power is the “exercise of direct control of one actor 
over another and the ability of an actor to ‘use material 
resources to advance its interest in direct opposition to the 
interests of another.’”51 As an international organization gov-
erned by its member states, without independent financial 
resources and with little systematically delegated authority, 
the extent to which IOM exerts compulsory power is starkly 
limited. However, IOM certainly exerts compulsory power 
over some forced migrants, such as those living in camps 
the agency has been mandated to close. Compulsory power 
is arguably also exerted in the context of assisted voluntary 
returns, the “voluntary” designation notwithstanding. IOM’s 
dependence on project-based funding makes it relatively 
beholden to the compulsory power of its donors (arguably 
even more so than other international organizations in the 
forced migration regime, such as UNHCR, which is reliant 
on earmarked voluntary contributions but has more central 
support through the UN system, and greater ability to chan-
nel funds to core thematic programs and concerns). Yet IOM 
in turn exercises a degree of compulsory power over NGO 
partners who become reliant on funding channelled through 
IOM. 
In considering the current and potential future roles of 
IOM in the forced migration regime, it is especially important 
to consider the ways in which—and the extent to which—
IOM, despite its reliance on project-based financing, medi-
ates the compulsory power of its donors and member states 
by refusing to undertake certain projects that pose problems 
in terms of respect for human rights and humanitarian prin-
ciples. IOM has agreed to participate in some programs pro-
posed by influential member states, such as Australia’s now 
defunct initiative to reroute asylum seekers to Cambodia, 
despite their negative protection repercussions. However, it 
also refuses to engage in some proposed projects; reviews of 
the accordance of the proposed activities with international 
standards inform this decision-making process, but other 
factors likely also influence institutional decision-making. 
Further research is needed to develop better accounts of how 
and when the agency makes such decisions, and the implica-
tions for understanding the exercise of compulsory power.
International organizations can also exert compulsory 
power by using “normative resources” to influence actors’ 
behaviour; indeed, some international agencies “are quite 
candid in their beliefs that one of their principal functions 
is to try to alter the behaviour of states and nonstate actors 
in order to ensure that they comply with existing normative 
and legal standards.”52 Although IOM increasingly draws on 
human rights and humanitarian principles in its work, the 
extent to which it appeals to normative resources to exert 
compulsory power is presently limited. IOM has developed 
an increased media presence in relation to, for example, the 
deaths of asylum seekers attempting to cross the Mediter-
ranean. Through such media work, IOM draws attention to 
failures to protect migrants (such as through the cancella-
tion of robust, EU-funded search-and-rescue efforts), but has 
not used overt shaming techniques more readily associated 
with compulsory power. Compulsory power may also be 
exercised through the strategic use of information, including 
the collection of some forms of data over others.53 IOM has 
dramatically expanded its involvement in data collection in 
humanitarian contexts, an activity that increases its compul-
sory power, but even more so its institutional power.
Institutional Power: Shaping Behaviour “At a Distance”
In contrast to compulsory power, institutional power may 
be understood as a more indirect aspect of power, which 
involves states crafting international organizations to 
advance their interests; these agencies may then go on to 
shape other actors’ behaviour.54 In wielding institutional 
power a particular actor may, through the procedures, rules, 
and activities of an institution, “guide, steer and constrain 
the actions (or non-actions) and conditions of existence” of 
other actors, whether states or international organizations.55 
Drawing on institutional power, international organizations 
can shape understandings, behaviours, and social contexts, 
including by downplaying or sidelining particular issues in 
agenda-setting processes.56
Understanding institutional power in relation to IOM 
entails analysis of how states use IOM to indirectly influence 
other actors and issues, and how IOM has positioned itself 
institutionally to achieve desired outcomes. IOM has, by some 
accounts, been used extensively in the former respect, with 
Ashutosh and Mountz arguing that “IOM functions as a state 
apparatus in supranational guise.”57 Indeed, on some levels 
IOM’s history is very much a story of states’ exercise of insti-
tutional power, with the United States using IOM’s precursor 
institutions as a way to address migration and displacement 
without having to cooperate with or cede power to the USSR. 
IOM remains an instrument of Northern foreign policy, more 
so than other international agencies, but institutional power 
in relation to IOM cannot be fully appreciated in isolation 
from examination of UNHCR.58 Having one international 
organization with a robust protection mandate, and another, 
more operationally focused agency has served the interests 
of member states whose policies and ambitions vis-à-vis the 
governance of (forced) migration are often far from coher-
ent. This configuration has suited states concerned to limit 
“mission creep” on the part of UNHCR and leery of increased, 
protection-oriented attention to issues such as displacement 
associated with the effects of climate change.
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For its part, IOM has sought to increase its own institutional 
power in the humanitarian sphere by participating in agenda-
setting, including in relation to the 2016 World Humanitarian 
Summit and the September 2016 UN Summit for Refugees 
and Migrants, and by assuming greater responsibility as the 
lead agency for camp coordination and management in post-
disaster settings. By taking on this role, IOM is particularly 
well positioned to exert institutional power through clas-
sificatory practices. A core characteristic of bureaucracies 
is their involvements in knowledge organization and classi-
fication.59 Indeed, the ability to create and infuse categories 
with prescribed meanings, to classify objects and people, and 
in so doing shift their very definition and identity, is one of 
bureaucracy’s greatest sources of power.60 UNHCR plays a 
major role in this regard, especially in refugee status determi-
nation, but IOM also exerts considerable institutional power 
in this respect, especially vis-à-vis IDPs. IOM’s involvement 
in exercising institutional power through classificatory prac-
tices has grown as it has developed significant new roles in 
data collection and dissemination in humanitarian contexts, 
including through the implementation of a tool known as 
the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). Whether explicitly 
or implicitly, data collection in conflict, post-conflict, and 
post-disaster contexts often involves categorizing people as 
displaced or not displaced, and increases IOM’s influence over 
other actors by putting IOM in a position whereby states and 
other international organizations come to depend on it for 
quantitative information on the “caseloads” who are the target 
of humanitarian interventions. Because the IOM Constitution 
does not, as aforementioned, give formal definitions of groups 
such as refugees and IDPs, the organization has considerable 
discretion in the approaches it may take to categorization in 
the context of data collection. For example, although IOM sup-
ports the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, in its 
data collection work in post-earthquake Haiti, IOM’s imple-
mentation of the Displacement Tracking Matrix focused 
predominantly on IDPs resident in camps. This perpetuated 
the perception that, despite the broader conceptualization of 
internal displacement in the Guiding Principles, IDPs in Haiti 
were simply those resident in camps, and that closing camps 
was tantamount to resolving the IDPs’ predicament.
Productive Power: Contributing to the “Constitution of 
Global Governance”
Productive power involves the creation of subjects through 
social interactions.61 Examining international organizations’ 
productive power underscores that these agencies not only 
help regulate the world, but are also involved in “constituting 
that world that needs to be regulated.”62 Through produc-
tive power, international organizations help establish certain 
issues as problems to be understood through the application 
of particular frames, and tackled through the deployment of 
particular strategies.63 
IOM is comparatively active in developing this aspect 
of its (potential) power as an international organization, 
intersecting with its exercise of institutional power through 
classificatory practices. For example, IOM exerts productive 
power by applying a displacement “lens” to post-disaster 
situations that are increasingly, but arguably need not neces-
sarily, viewed as forced migration crises. The agency has also 
applied productive power, alongside other actors, to position 
displacement associated with the effects of climate change 
as a pressing contemporary and future challenge, and to 
establish migrants uprooted in crises as a group in need of 
greater attention and a more systematic response. Through 
a cooperative effort, IOM helped make the Libyan revolu-
tion catalytic in drawing attention to this issue, using it as 
a springboard to develop institutional frameworks to struc-
ture future responses to similar situations. Through produc-
tive power, international organizations shape what progress 
is understood to entail. In this and other situations, IOM has 
applied productive power to make the case that progress 
must entail a forced migration regime that responds reliably 
and more equitably to those forced from their homes, but 
who may not fit into traditionally established or understood 
categories such as refugees or IDPs uprooted by conflict.
Conclusion
As Milner stresses, understandings of power and influence 
in the forced migration regime must be historically situated; 
that is, they must be sensitive to the ways in which power rela-
tions shift over time.64 Such historically situated analyses are 
more likely to illuminate the evolution and expanding roles 
of institutions like IOM. Opinions are divided on the implica-
tions of IOM taking on a more active role in the forced migra-
tion regime, and in the governance of migration more gener-
ally. For example, Martin argues that IOM has “the strongest 
capabilities to take on the range of activities needed if an 
international migration regime were to be adopted,” while 
Ashutosh and Mountz contend that IOM works in favour of 
nation states to the detriment of people on the move, and 
characterize IOM’s embrace of human rights language as little 
more than window dressing.65 I have suggested that while 
IOM’s engagement in the humanitarian sphere has brought 
with it increased attention to groups that could otherwise 
fall through the cracks of international response systems, 
particularly IDPs in disasters and migrant workers uprooted 
in crises, a clear need remains for the agency to continue 
to develop a more explicitly protection-oriented response to 
forced migration. The extent to which IOM delivers on this 
in a systematic manner will depend on the commitment and 
direction the organization receives from its member states, 
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and on IOM’s own internal efforts. This will hinge in part on 
the capacity of protection protagonists within IOM to more 
comprehensively socialize humanitarian and human rights 
principles within the organization, and overcome internal 
debates and divides, particularly as they relate to declining 
to undertake projects in tension with humanitarian and 
human rights values.
Whatever one’s perspective on these debates, it is now clear 
that IOM plays major roles in the forced migration regime, 
and that these roles are likely to grow in the future, such that 
to understand IOM one needs to understand its roles in the 
humanitarian system and forced migration regime. Equally, 
to understand these systems one needs to understand the 
shifting roles of IOM, and its approaches to accruing and 
exercising authority and power. This in turn demands fur-
ther research on IOM’s historical and ongoing evolution, and 
its political, operational, and normative consequences.
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